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The sale of cannabis will continue to be an offence. If the rules set out above are not observed, the premises are closed down and the owners or management may be prosecuted. Under the official drug guidelines, coffee shops may stock up to 500 grams of cannabis without facing prosecution. Municipalities may impose additional rules on coffee shops in order to avoid nuisance" (Openbaar Ministrie, 2010) .
Enforcement of these rules didn't have real teeth until 1997, when officials began closing coffeeshops for non-compliance. Between 1997 and , the number of retail cannabis outlets dropped 40 percent, from 1,179 to 702 (Bieleman et al., 2005 (Bieleman et al., , 2009 ).
In the past few years, the Dutch have had lively debates about the coffeeshop model. (See ABC, 2008; NIS News, 2006 , 2010 NRC Handelsblad, 2008; IHT, 2007.) To eliminate the so-called "backdoor" problem of legal inconsistency, some officials argue that municipalities or coffeeshop owners should be allowed to legally cultivate cannabis in order. Others contend that this would violate international UN and EU agreements. Some officials have called for a complete ban on sales to non-Dutch tourists; others contend that this would violate Dutch human rights laws. But most officials, and most Dutch citizens, stand by the basic approach as an expression of Dutch gedoogcultuur ("culture of permissiveness") and as a pragmatic "least worst" solution. (For an enlightening historical account, see Amsterdam Tourist Information, 2007 .)
The purpose is not to judge the Netherlands or inform its own decisions about the future, but to see what California can learn about potential policy options and outcomes by drawing on the Dutch experience. Regardless of how one feels about the Dutch system, there is little doubt that the US and indeed the world can learn from the Dutch willingness to experiment, and their energetic and thorough efforts to document their policies and outcomes.
A blanket caveat at the outset: In 1993, I coauthored an essay documenting the daunting analytical pitfalls of making cross-national comparisons of drug policies and outcomes (MacCoun, Reuter, Kahan, & Saiger, 1993) . But within a few years, our reticence largely evaporated:
The Pompidou Group's multi-city study (Hartnoll, 1994) places the following banner atop many of its tables of cross-city drug indicators: Warning! These data are not directly comparable. That label is perfectly justified, and we are tempted to affix the same flag on each of the tables and figures that follow. But pragmatically, there is little point in assembling comparative data unless one is prepared to risk error and make comparisons, and to make it easier for readers to do the same. Moreover there is good reason for doing so. Given the difficulties of "learning by doing" in any one nation's battle against drug problems, people inevitably look to cross-national comparisons for guidance. Our hope is to clarify what can and can't be learned from them. (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001 )
PREVALENCE AND PATTERNS OF CANNABIS USE
A decade ago, MacCoun and Reuter (1997 , 2001a , 2001d Are Dutch youth more likely to try cannabis than they might be without the coffeeshop system? One way of addressing this question is to compare how Dutch youth rank relative to other European nations with respect to the use of other substance. Figure 2 shows that Dutch students do indeed rank higher for lifetime prevalence of cannabis than for tobacco use, getting drunk, or use of other illicit drugs. Because 15-16 year olds are not allowed to frequent the Dutch cannabis coffeeshops, we might expect to see a larger effect among young adults. It is possible to compare estimates in the 15-34 year age group from various European nations; Figure 3 presents averages for nations with at least 3 estimates over the period 1998-2005. 2 Over that period, the Netherlands rate was well above Sweden, but below that of many of its neighbors. 2003 and 2007) . Note that this association is not a direct test of the effects of availability on use; it is very likely that users do have higher ease of obtaining cannabis than non-using students, and both items may be picking up the shared effects of one's peer group. But as one might expect, the Dutch youth do report higher than average availability of cannabis. Still, they fall well short of the levels reported in the USA and some other countries, and the Dutch data fit right on the trend line. Access to Dutch cannabis could have effects on the perceived (and actual) availability among non-Dutch citizens as well, as long alleged by officials in Belgium and other neighboring countries. Figure 5 suggests this is plausible. There is an inverse association (r = -.31) between students' perceptions of availability and the actual distance between their country and the Netherlands, even including one discrepant data point (Spain). But this is circumstantial evidence -there is surely "spatially autocorrelated error" due to other shared features of culture and geography --and data on drug tourism and smuggling are too sparse to permit a stronger test. (Table 28 ) and basic geographic data.
Are the Dutch More Likely to Escalate Their Cannabis Use?
By facilitating relatively easy access to cannabis, it is conceivable that the Dutch system might alter the length, intensity, and duration of a cannabis using "career." Table 1 shows some evidence for this in student data. The Dutch youth are somewhat more likely to have used frequently, and they arre somewhat more likely to start using early (before age 13), compared to their European neighbors, and in this respect they bear a closer resemblance to students in the USA. They perceive less risk from regular cannabis use than their peers in either Europe or the USA. When we look to data for all adults, however, it is much harder to see any evidence that the Dutch system produces an increase in the intensity or duration of using careers. For example, one might expect that Dutch adults would be more likely to escalate from casual experimentation to regular use, but the "continuation rate" in Figure But what about regular Dutch users -do they consume use more cannabis than they might in other countries with less availability? A comparison of regular users in Amsterdam and San Francisco (Reinerman, Cohen, & Kaal, 2004) found quite similar rates of self-reported use (Table 2) . In both cities, the Dutch 5 gram limit would provide a month or more of use for the typical regular user. Figure 2 One might expect that the ready availability would serve to extend the length of a using career. Figure 7 (top and bottom panels) examines this issue using two different types of prevalence (past month vs. past year), two different years (2001 vs. 2005) , and surveys by two different Dutch organizations (CEDRO vs. IVO).
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Both panels tell the same basic story: Dutch users appear to "mature out" of cannabis use at a faster rate than their American counterparts. 3 The US data from NSDUH were collected using in-person interviews with a computer assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) method for sensitive questions. The 2001 Dutch survey (Abraham et al., 2002) includes data from 3,000 respondents who used CAPI, and 15,000 respondents who were allowed to choose among face-to-face, CAPI, paper, or web-based responding; this produced statistically significant effects on responses but they were small and so the datasets were merged. The 2005 survey (see Rodenburg et al., 2007) includes data from 4,516 people who completed an in-person computer-assisted personal interviewing (CAPI) method for sensitive questions, and 20,282 citizens who provided data using a web-based online survey; because the latter data appeared to suffer from greater selective non-response, the prevalence estimates come from the CAPI subsample. 
Does the Dutch System Affect the "Gateway" Association with Hard Drugs?
As noted earlier, a key part of the rationale for the Dutch coffeeshop system was the hypothesis that "separating the markets" would weaken the statistical "gateway" association between cannabis and hard drug use (see MacCoun & Reuter, 2001 for a more elaborate discussion). Figure 8 presents the ratio of people who have tried cocaine (top panel) or amphetamines (bottom panel) to those who have tried cannabis. (Heroin use is too rarely reported in the surveys to permit a similar estimate.) These ratios provide some evidence for a weakened gateway in the Netherlands. Another way to examine this question is to see whether perceived ease of access to cannabis is correlated with the lifetime prevalence of the use of any illicit drug other than cannabis among students. Figure 9 shows that there is a clear correlation (r = .61), but the Dutch use of the other illicits is somewhat lower than predicted, and the US is well above the predicted rate. These data don't necessarily support the "weakened gateway" hypothesis, but they clearly challenge any claim that the Dutch have strengthened the gateway to hard drug use. There are several other lines of indirect evidence. Concordance rates for marijuana use by twins in the Netherlands and Australia are similar, which could suggest a common developmental pathway irrespective of law or culture (Lynskey, Vink, & Boomsma, 2006) . Using a bivariate duration model, van Ours (2003) -a labor economist who studies "stepping stones" in other economic contexts --finds evidence consistent with a causal gateway effect in Amsterdam, but he concludes that:
"the multiple use of both drugs is mostly related to correlated (unobserved) heterogeneity. A lot of individuals with a greater susceptibility to consume cannabis also have a greater susceptibility to use cocaine. The Dutch policy to separate the markets of soft drugs and hard drugs does not seem to be irrational. Whatever the opinion on Dutch drug policy, it is clear from this study that allowing controlled use of soft drugs does not have the detrimental effect of stimulating the consumption of hard drugs."
THE COMMERCIALIZATION HYPOTHESIS
In a 1997 article in Science, MacCoun and Reuter argue that the effects of the 1976 Dutch policy change evolved over time. They presented data suggesting that no detectable effects on cannabis use among Dutch citizens in the first six or seven years, which they characterized as "the depenalization era." But MacCoun and Reuter argued that :
In the 1984 to 1996 period, which we characterize as a progression from depenalization to de facto legalization, these surveys reveal that the lifetime prevalence of cannabis in Holland has increased consistently and sharply. For the age group 18-20, the increase is from 15% in 1984 to 44% in 1996; past month prevalence for the same group rose from 8.5% to 18.5%... MacCoun and Reuter (1997) argued that the increases in use between 1984 and 1992 were not paralleled in other nations, and that a plausible explanation was the rapid expansion of retail cannabis outlets. As seen in Figure 10 
MacCoun and Reuter argued that:
The increases in Dutch prevalence from 1984 to 1992 provide the strongest evidence that the Dutch regime might have increased cannabis use among youth. Why would the removal of criminal penalties for possession and small-scale sales require 8 years to have an effect? We hypothesize that this is the consequence of the gradual progression from a passive depenalization regime to the broader de facto legalization that allowed for greater access and increasing levels of promotion, at least until 1995, when the policy was revised.
Since 1997, MacCoun and Reuter's commercialization thesis has been debated in the literature, and a number of scholars have disputed it (Abraham, Cohen, & Beukenhorst, 2001; de Zwart & van Laar, 2001; Korf, 2002; Reinerman, Cohen, & Kaal, 2004) . The paper is occasionally cited in the mass media and on the web; and authors often selectively cite either the "no effect of depenalization" argument or the "commercialization increases use" argument, and some have grossly misrepresented the statistical arguments of the paper (see MacCoun, 2001 ).
Here, we consider and respond to some of the most potent counterarguments (also see MacCoun & Reuter, 2001a , 2001b , 2001c , 2001d .
Correlation doesn't prove causation. Absolutely. As MacCoun and Reuter stated in 1997, "the association may not be causal; we have already seen that recent increases occurred in the United States and Oslo despite very different policies." But they also argued that the commercialization hypothesis was both theoretically plausible and arguably consistent with evidence from experiences with the commercialization of tobacco, alcohol, and gambling. There is no doubt that the data presented in the top of Figure 10 , along with the other lines of evidence in MacCoun and Reuter (1997) fall well short of what contemporary methodological standards require for strong causal inference. But there is simply no other source of evidence on the effects of tolerated retail sales of cannabis in modern times.
The Dutch are now below the US and many of their neighbors in cannabis use.
Again, we absolutely agree. But as illustrated by the quotes above, our thesis was not that the Dutch system led to a permanent increase in use relative to its neighbors. Rather, we argue that the evidence for the commercialization effect occurred in the 1984 to 1992 period. This was a period in which prevalence trends were either flat or declining in the US, Oslo, Catalunya, Stockholm, Denmark, Germany, Canada, and Australia (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001a , 2001d ). As we wrote in 2001:
We hypothesize that the dramatic mid-1980s escalation in Dutch cannabis use is the consequence of the gradual progression from a passive depenalization regime to the broader de facto legalization which allowed for greater access and increasing levels of promotion, at least until 1995 when the policy was revised. In short, a shift from a depenalization era to a commercialization era. …We should be clear about what we are and are not claiming. First, we are not claiming that the increases circa 1984-1992 are solely attributable to coffee shop commercialization. Second, we are not claiming that commercialization is synonymous with coffee shop transactions; commercialization also involves the heightened salience and glamorization (in the youth cultural sense) that results from widespread, highly visible promotion-in shop signs and advertisements, but also in countercultural media ads, postcards, and posters.
Although the evidence is again largely circumstantial, the subsequent decline in Dutch cannabis levels between 1996 and 2000 is also consistent with the commercialization thesis, because (as seen in the lower panel of Figure 10 ), it too coincided with a change in the number of coffeeshops -in this case, a decline. (Unfortunately, there are no systematic counts of coffeeshops between Jansen's 1988 count for Amsterdam and the Intraval census studies beginning in 1996.) One might expect a decline in the number of coffeeshops to be a response to declining prevalence, rather than a cause, but this is unlikely to be the primary story, for two reasons. First, the prevalence data are for Dutch citizens, and there is little evidence that "drug tourism" was declining during this period. Second, the majority of the coffeeshop closings were due to complaints, violations of the AHOJ-G rules, or policy decisions by local governments, rather than economic considerations (Bieleman et al., 2008; Deutsche Welle, 2007) . There are of course other relevant considerations, including the fact that the legal age for coffeeshop purchases was raised from 16 to 18 years in 1996 (Monshouwer et al., 2005) .
Because the decline in coffeeshops was steeper than the decline in prevalence, it is likely that over time, the remaining coffeeshops expanded their sales to meet the demand. But there are reasons to doubt that such an effect was enough to offset the impact of the closings. Fewer shops meant less visibility and salience and greater search time and hassle for customers. Also, increasing their "backdoor" inventories exposes the remaining owners to greater legal risk, and puts them on notice that visible advertising or neighborhood complaints could put them out of business. Finally, most shops can't easily expand their facilities because they are located in densely packed buildings and neighborhoods, and Dutch commercial real estate is very expensive.
The MacCoun and Reuter analysis misleadingly mixes urban data (from Amsterdam)
with national-level estimates from the USA and other countries. MacCoun and Reuter (1997) offered 15 different contrasts between Dutch and non-Dutch estimates that matched in year and type of prevalence (lifetime, past-year, etc.) . Seven compared Amsterdam data to national data from other countries. The paper was quite explicit this fact, and about the drawbacks of such comparisons, but we argued that:
American surveys indicate little difference on average between large metropolitan samples and the United States as a whole (3), but the estimates in Table 1 suggest that smaller Dutch communities (Tilburg and Utrecht) have lower rates than Amsterdam. U.S. rates are lower than that of Amsterdam, similar to that of Utrecht, and higher than that of Tilburg. (MacCoun & Reuter, 1997, p. 49) As we later explained (MacCoun & Reuter, 2001c) , these comparisons actually provide further evidence for the commercialization hypothesis. Why? …the fact that cannabis prevalence is higher in Amsterdam is quite consistent with our hypothesis. During the 1980s, when we contend the commercialisation effect occurred, various estimates suggest that over a quarter of all Dutch cannabis coffee shops were in Amsterdam, yet Amsterdam accounted for only about 5% of the total Dutch population. As late as 1997, Abraham et al (1999) reported that last-year users from the highest-density Dutch addresses were more likely to cite coffee shops as their cannabis source than were users from lowdensity Dutch addresses.
It is now possible to strengthen this argument. As seen in Table 3, 2001 is the one year where there are good estimates of both prevalence and the availability of coffeeshops, by location. While the data cannot establish a causal relationship, the table leaves little doubt that prevalence among citizens is higher in the locations with more coffeeshops. 
CLIENTS IN TREATMENT FOR CANNABIS USE
Statistically, perhaps the most distinctive feature of Dutch cannabis use is that their citizens seem to have a higher likelihood of being admitted to treatment for cannabis use than is true for most countries in Europe (Figure 11 top) . The finding is even more pronounced when calculated on a past-year user basis (Figure 11 bottom). (Tables TDI-1 [new It is difficult to know how to interpret this high treatment rate. Does it reflect a greater need for cannabis treatment in the Netherlands than other countries? This is possible, but it is difficult to reconcile with their relatively modest cannabis continuation rates (relative to Europe), quantities consumed (at least relative to San Francisco), and the age curve for cannabis use (relative to the US). Another possibility is that the Dutch are more generous and proactive in providing treatment through their health care system. Reuter (2006) estimates that the Dutch government spends about 9,200 euros per "problematic drug user" on treatment; the comparable estimate for Sweden -a country with an active coerced treatment tradition --is about 7,600 euros. Figure 13 suggests that cannabis accounts for a rising share of treatment clients in the Netherlands and many of its neighbors, and that the trend is less pronounced in the US.
(Cannabis accounts for a smaller share of treatment clients because A full analysis of this trend would require data on possible age, period, and cohort effects (the aging of cocaine and heroin addicts), but at face value, it appears that the Dutch have diverged from their neighbors in the past few years. SOURCE: European data from EMCDDA (Table TDI-3) . Table 4 compares treatment admission rates for the Netherlands and the US. The estimates of treatment may not be directly comparable -for both countries the numbers reflect admissions for cannabis (a flow rather than a stock variable) but it is not clear whether they are equally successful (or, rather, unsuccessful) at covering inpatient vs. outpatient and private vs. public treatment.
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But it appears that on a per-capita basis, the US has about 4 marijuana treatment admissions for every Dutch admission; on a per pastmonth user basis the ratio is 1.8:1. About half the US admissions are criminal justice referrals vs. about 10 percent of the Dutch admissions (TEDS; Ouwehand et al., 2006, p. 11) . If we exclude these referrals, we end up with 6 admissions per 1000 past-month users in each country. So it appears that users are more likely to find their way into treatment in the US than in the Netherlands, but that the difference is probably attributable to the much greater use of criminal justice referrals in the US. 
CANNABIS PRICES, POTENCY, AND SUPPLY REDUCTION
It is very likely that full-scale legalization would significantly reduce cannabis prices (see Kilmer et al., forthcoming; Caulkins, forthcoming) . The Dutch do not have a true legalization regime; it is best characterized as "de facto" legalization, and even then, only at the retail level. It is not clear how officials in each country generate these estimates, or whether they do so in a similar way. The comparisons are further muddied by the stark difference in policy between the Netherlands and the other nations.
At least for the Netherlands, two recent studies provide more rigorous estimates of Dutch prices on a purity-adjusted basis. Pijlman et al. (2005) purchased each of 4 different cannabis preparations from 50 randomly selected coffeeshops each year between 2000 and 2004. For 2004, the average Euros-per-gram price was 6 for Nederwiet, 4.9 for imported marijuana, 12.5 for Nederhasj, and 6.6 for imported hashish. This is in the $6 to $15 range per gram for 2004$; interestingly the Dutch herb and resin products were more expensive than their imported counterparts. Hazekamp (2006) obtained and analyzed 13 samples obtained from 11 Dutch locations; each proprietor was asked to recommend a product for a family member who was allegedly "suffering from multiple sclerosis." He found prices in the 5 to 9 euro/gram range --about $6 to $11 per gram. (This is after correcting for the fact that all but 2 of his 13 samples were less than the advertised 10 grams!) Table 6 summarized the key results of these two studies. Why are the Dutch prices so high in a quasi-legalization regime -does this indicate that legalization has no effect on prices? Such a conclusion is unwarranted. First, the Dutch price data include retailer markups to cover the costs the owners incur in operating retail outlets in commercial neighborhoods.
Second, it seems likely that prices in the Netherlands are elevated by their unusual hybrid regime which approximates legalization at the user level, but European style prohibition at the level of the growers and traffickers (MacCoun & Reuter, 1997 ) -with coffeeshop owners in a grey area somewhere between. If high-level Dutch traffickers face an enforcement risk, they presumably pass this along in higher prices down the supply chain (Reuter & Kleiman, 1986) .
It is extremely difficult to find good comparative data on the stringency of enforcement against cannabis growers and traffickers anywhere in Europe. In 2004, roughly 40 percent of Opium Act cases were for soft drugs; they accounted for about 2 percent of the total detention years imposed that year (van Ooyen-Houben & Meijer, 2006) . Figure 14 shows that a much less direct measure -convictions for any drug offenses (averaged for 4 years to reduce noise) -the Dutch are more lenient than many but by no means all of their neighbors. Unfortunately, I have not been able to break these figures out by drug, much less by criminal charge. [NOTE: I will later try to put these on a per-user basis] S p a i n P o r t u g a l I t a l y F r a n c e B e l g i u m A u s t r i a N e t h e r l a n d s G e r m a n y I r e l a n d E n g l a n d & W a l e s S w e d e n D e n m a r k F i n l a n d S w i t z e r l a n d SOURCE: Author's calculations using data from European Sourcebook of Criminal Justice Statistics, Table 3 .2.1.12. Table 7 shows that the Dutch seize a lot more cannabis (per 100,000 citizens) than many European countries, but at a rate almost identical to the UK. This is difficult to interpret because there may be more herbal cannabis available to seize in the Netherlands, and the cannabis is probably higher in ptency; the country's prominent role in legitimate international trade surely plays a role as well. At best, we can take these data -together with routine reports of particular police actions in the Dutch media --as an existence proof that the Dutch are clearly enforcing prohibition at the higher end of the supply chain. Presumably this is keeping prices elevated. The best available evidence paints a nuanced picture. Dutch citizens use cannabis at more modest rates than some of their neighbors, and they don't appear to be particularly likely to escalate their use relative to their counterparts in Europe and the US. Moreover, there are indications that rather than increasing "the gateway" to hard drug use, separating the soft and drug markets possibly reduced the gateway, though it is difficult to test this argument with any rigor.
But the Dutch experience also raises some cautionary notes. There are several lines of circumstantial evidence that the Dutch retail system increased consumption, especially in its early years when coffeeshops were spreading, open to 16 year olds, and advertised more visibly than they do today. And if so, this increase occurred in a hybrid system in which high-level enforcement probably served to keep prices from dropping the way they might in a full-scale legalization scheme. Many people look to the Netherlands as a model for what might happen if cannabis were legalized in California. But what the Dutch have done is quite different, and far more nuanced, than what is proposed in the Assembly bill and ballot initiative that are currently (as of July 2010) under consideration in California. The Dutch system is ambiguous by design, and it is ambiguous in ways that give officials leverage over prices and sales in ways that might be far harder to achieve in a full-scale legalization regime.
APPENDIX: What is The Dutch Cannabis Market Worth?

Top-down estimate
According to Dutch police official Max Daniel, "Foreign buyers pay three or four times the Dutch price. ...We have estimated that at least 80 percent of what is grown in the Netherlands is exported. More than €2 billion ($2.7 billion) worth of cannabis is exported every year." (NRC Handelsblad, 2008) . Assuming a 3:1 price ratio, this implies that the local market is worth €286 million and that the total market is worth €2.5 billion.
Bottom-up estimate
In 2005, about 611,518 Dutch citizens used cannabis. If we assume that total consumption is about 100 grams per past-year user (see Kilmer et al., 2010) , then that implies about 61,152 kg of cannabis.
The Dutch Tourist Information (2008) claims that in 2007, 26 percent of the 4.5 million tourists in the Netherlands visit a cannabis coffeeshop -about 1,125,000 people. If we assume each one purchases 1 gram -an assumption for which we have little evidencethat would imply another 1,125 kg of cannabis, for a total domestic amount of 62,277 kg.
If this amount sold for somewhere between €5 to €9 per gram, that would imply that the domestic market was worth €311 to €560 million a year. This would be 14 to 25 percent of the top-down estimate of the total market size, consistent with the assertion that at least 80 percent of production is for export.
Kilmer, Pacula, & Reuter estimate
After I made these calculations I learned of a third estimate produced by Kilmer, Pacula, and Reuter (2010) , using somewhat different assumptions and calculations. For 2005, they estimate that the Dutch retail cannabis market was between 32.8 and 152.4 metric tons (MT); their best estimate was 73.3 MT. They estimate that this market's value was between €172.9 and €804.9 million; their best estimate was €386.9 million. This is reasonably close to my bottom-up estimate of 62 MT of cannabis, worth €311 to €560 million.
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